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1. Introduction 
In this paper I pay attention to and reflect upon the role and the nature of the human being
considered as an individual that acts in a collective dimension and thus contributes to build a
social reality. What is required to talk of collectivity? Is it anything that goes beyond the
interacting individuals or not? In order to talk of collectivity, do we need to talk of a plural
subject as well as of collective beliefs, (as Margaret Gilbert does), or not?
These are some questions that are addressed in my paper. In particular, I outline the view
that the collectivity is the relationship among interacting individuals in the exercise of their
own rationality. Consequently, I argue that the collectivity is built as a form of social
interaction among and within the individuals, because there is a We-mode[1] embodied in
each individual through the dialectic and dialogic structure that is constitutive of her. This
dialectic nature of the Individual implies the involvement of other individuals in the exercise
of each individual’s rationality, that is a collectivity as at least two or more human beings
which think, speak, and act committing to any other through one’s own thoughts, words or
actions. In this connection I refer to Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction, built in a
linguistic and dialogical form, to the transcendental-pragmatic nature of Habermas’ validity
claims and to Gilbert’s concepts of joint commitment and plural subject. In particular I will
argue that the dialectic nature of each individual as We-mode, which implies the involvement
of other individuals as a collectivity, can be derived already from Aristotle’s principle of non-
contradiction and Habermas’ validity claims. Indeed the dialectic and intersubjective nature
of each individual itself provides the condition of the joint commitment, which Gilbert is
right to believe to be the foundation of every collectivity, but it does not require to claim for
a plural subject that should be coincident with the collectivity itself.
2. Individuals and Collectivity without Plural Subject 
I think that this dialectic and intersubjective nature of any subject has not the same meaning
of Gilbert’s plural subject,[2] because with subject I always mean the individual as the single
human being who interacts with other individuals instead of a body or a unit whose life and
development go beyond the single individuals who have contributed to give it a shape.
However, I think that Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment is a critical notion in the
question at issue. In fact, the collective dimension and the commitments it implies are not
guaranteed by something over the individuals but by the dialogic rationality inherent in each
individual who consequently is jointly committed. In this connection Gilbert’s concept of
joint commitment is fundamental to describe the characteristic of the collectivity, of the
group. On this account, one is entitled to talk of 'we', of a group or a collectivity if two or
more people are jointly committed to one another in some way. The joint commitment takes
place when two or more people are committed, namely they mutually state their readiness to
do, say or think something together.[3] In this connection, I agree with Gilbert that this
concept of joint commitment is a fundamental everyday concept, incorporated in many
central social concepts such as those of social rules, a tradition and an action performed
together with another person.[4] In everyday life human beings make always joint
commitments that imply rights and obligations for the parties because they are shared.
Consequently, two or more people are a group, a collectivity that shares intentions and doing
something. They are committed to one another, that is to say they indicate their readiness to
have that intention or to act in that way. On this account, the feature of the group or of the
collectivity is not the number of people involved, rather their mutual commitment to say or
do something. The commitment implies relationships that are specified as rights and
obligations for the parties that have been mutually committed to one another. This means
that who is jointly committed to do X has the obligation to do X and the right to rebuke any
one who decides not to do X or not to accomplish X even though she had previously indicated
her own readiness to do X. Gilbert is right in pointing out that the parties, which make the
group or the collectivity and are jointly committed, are not entitled to withdraw unilaterally
from the taken commitment just because it is shared on the grounds of a more or less
explicit readiness. However, I think it is necessary to specify further what the joint
commitment implies. The implication of the joint commitment is not just that one is not
entitled to withdraw unilaterally from the commitment, because this can be always the case
as a matter of fact and belongs to the individual power of the parties engaged in the collective
dimension. Rather the implication is that were a to withdraw unilaterally, the other parties
are necessarily bound to rebuke her in virtue of the rights and the obligations implied by the
commitment. Therefore the other parties of the group call that party to account for her
behaviour for which she is compelled to answer owing to the game of giving and asking for
reasons, which is peculiar to human reason as I will show later. With a good degree of
certainty one may claim that the joint commitment is the condition of collective action,
hence it makes the collectivity, the group, which are not mere aggregate, to emerge. However
this claim does not mean that the concept of joint commitment needs arguing for a unitary
body or a unitary whole over and above the individuals, that which Gilbert calls a plural
subject. The subject to which Gilbert makes reference is not individual rather it is a body
that is beyond the single subjects. Single subjects depend on it in the name of the joint
commitment and the feature of being jointly fulfilled is what makes this body plural in the
sense of being contrary to what is singular or individual. Gilbert gives the following
definition of the joint commitment: 'X and Y and whatever others are jointly committed to x
as a body'. The answer to the question about what being jointly committed to x as a body
means is that 'the parties emulate a single x-er'.[5] Whenever Gilbert addresses this question,
she employs the term plural subject to refer to this body. On her account, these two concepts
make the difference that allows talking of a collectivity that is jointly committed rather than
being a mere aggregate of individuals. In this respect she distinguishes between subjective
and objective stance and argues that only the latter allows for the collectivity and the joint
commitment, because the objective stance provides the context in which the individualities
are surpassed towards an objective dimension that is unitary and not individual (plural
subject).[6] On the grounds of the primacy of the unity and the objectivity over the
individualities Gilbert argues that subjects and parties emulate a single x-er. However
claiming that the parties emulate a single x-er is conceding that there exist single individuals,
which within a collectivity or a group behave as if they were a body and a unity beyond their
own individuality. This mean that as a matter of fact this kind of body or unit, which to
Gilbert is coincident with the plural subject, does not exist as such. Rather it is a sort of
simulation carried out by the individuals as parties of the collectivity.[7]
The question addressed in this paper is then: does talking of joint commitment and
collectivity require the sacrifice of the individuals by constraining them within the space of
the plural subject as a body and a unit which does not do the capacity of human rationality
justice? I am inclined to answer this question negatively, because talking of collectivity does
not need establishing a plural subject and a kind of unity that are opposite to an individualist
model. This paper will rather put forth arguments in favour of such an account.
Indeed it is each individual that can be jointly committed to other individuals, thus giving
rise to the social reality that coincides with and derives from that interpersonal relation in
which every individual who takes part in it is protagonist. For this reason, I think that it is
not necessary to talk of a plural subject as a body or a unit, as Gilbert does, to make
reference to the collectivity and to set the condition of the commitment. The force of the
joint commitment is due to the force of the rational argumentation that is peculiar to the
human being in the social dimension in which she is always historically placed, just as I will
show on the grounds of Aristotle’s demonstration of the principle of non-contradiction by
the 'elenctic refutation' as well as of Habermas’ transcendental pragmatic presuppositions.
3. Aristotle and the Principle of Non-Contradiction 
In this connection, I think that Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction, which is
constructed in a linguistic and a dialogic form, provides us still with a fundamental reference.
Indeed Aristotle’s demonstration of the principle of non-contradiction by the 'elenctic
refutation' stems from language, because he considers the fact that the adversary might talk
or merely say something as the sufficient proof of the necessity of the principle.[8] Who says
something, is committed to say something determinate, namely something with a definite
meaning, because any uttered word always conveys that particular meaning instead of any
other one or many ones at the same time. Were it not the case, one could not even utter a
word or talk. Therefore, we cannot fail to meet the principle of non-contradiction. When the
individuals exercise their rationality giving it a linguistic articulation, they are committed to
satisfy implicitly a principle of determinateness, owing to which thinking requires thinking
something under that respect in that moment rather than any thing else, something that can
be expressed in that well defined way rather than any other one. Otherwise, there could be
neither rationality nor its linguistic articulation. Accordingly, whoever denies the principle of
non-contradiction undergoes the paradox of denying herself and the others the exercise itself
of rationality. In this sense, the principle of non-contradiction is inherent in human
rationality and it induces strongly each human being to be committed not only to herself but
also to the others, when she says something or simply acts. If X says something to Y in the
context C, for instance 'now it is raining', X is not entitled to say 'now it is not raining' in the
same C. Should she say this, Y will have the full right to criticize X and disapprove what she
said in C. Therefore, saying something to someone in a context makes the one who talks
committed to the hearer. That is already a joint commitment. This commitment would hold
even though a particular individual restricted herself from talking and saying anything and
decided only to act. To be consistent, indeed, whoever denies the principle of non-
contradiction should not only refuse to talk or to utter words but also to even think and act.
Aristotle made already this point against the sophists.[9] It is no accident that just against
the principle of non-contradiction they argued that anything is possible (that is one thing and
its contrary) and that they derived the extreme consequence that there are no being and not-
being, no true and false, no right and wrong, no more and less, no better and worse. As
significant as this consequence is Aristotle’s confutation of that sophistic argument, which he
charged with scepticism and relativism. Aristotle argued that those who deny the principle of
non-contradiction should neither talk nor utter a word nor even think or act in order to be
consistent with their thesis. If one talks, she always states something determinate instead of
any other thing. If one thinks, she always thinks something and cannot think the contrary at
the same time. If one acts, she selects one action in place of any other one. To support the
necessary character of the principle of non-contradiction, Aristotle brings the case of going to
Megara or not.[10] Were the relativists right, every one would believe something true and be
deceived at the same time, believing that something is the case and believing that it is not
would make no difference because there would not be any thought of something determinate,
but as a consequence they would not differ from plants. On such grounds why who affirms to
reason that way goes then actually to Megara instead of remaining where she is while merely
figuring that she goes there or rather figuring nothing at all? In fact who attempts to deny the
principle of non-contradiction, continuously affirms it by talking, thinking and acting in a
particular manner rather than in any other. This is the indirect yet conclusive demonstration
of the necessity, hence the universality, of the principle. Whoever did not satisfy this
principle, would undergo the paradox of being bound to vegetate, since she would be obliged
to give up what belongs constitutively to her: the exercise of rationality as the capability of
thought, language and action.
However is it really possible to give up one’s own nature of a rational and social being that is
committed to oneself as well as the others when she acts, thinks and articulates her
thoughts? The answer to this question is the same as that of Aristotle’s case of going to
Megara or not. It is impossible that a human being behaves like a plant, because even not
acting, for instance remaining at the place where one actually is rather than going to Megara,
is the outcome of a particular choice, hence the implicit and necessary acknowledgement that
every one always acts, thinks and talks in a determinate manner.
Accordingly to answer the previous question one can state that the above-mentioned paradox
of being like a plant is not real for two reasons. First, an individual is conditioned by the
context in which she is born and develops. This context has such an essentially social
character that carrying out an action without being committed to within the context of a
dialogic and interpersonal relationship is not possible. Second, an individual is above all
determined by herself, by her rationality that makes her always think, talk and act
dialogically within a plural dimension on whose grounds she is committed to an
interpersonal level.
The single individual implies necessarily a plurality of individuals for her exercise of
rationality to obtain. Every individual is responsible to herself and to the plurality of other
individuals for her determinate thoughts, words and actions. For this reason the principle of
non-contradiction is a necessary and constitutive rule for every rational being and it makes a
group of individuals a collectivity, whose open and plural nature is recognized by any one of
its members according to its determinate and regulated character. The joint commitment,
upon which the collectivity is founded, derives from the dialogic and dialectic nature of the
rationality that is inherent in each individual. The constitutive nature of the principle of non-
contradiction shows that every individual is always implicitly or explicitly committed to
other individuals and that this necessary mutual or, as Gilbert says, joint commitment is one
of the intrinsic properties of the individual, who accordingly has a We-mode by nature. There
is no need, therefore, to bring in such an ambiguous concept as the 'Plural subject as a body',
which should be intended as something more than and different from the sum of the single
individuals.
4. Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action and Validity Claims 
From this point of view also Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action shows that the
commitment to other individuals is expressed by the force of rationality intended as the
force of the argumentation. The concept of validity claims can be used to support this account
of the relationship between the individual and the collectivity. Each individual who takes
part in the discourse raises necessarily claims to the truth, the truthfulness, and the rightness
so that she must give before other individuals the reasons for what she says. Likewise, the
other individuals are allowed to ask the reasons for the validity of her arguments only if they
meet the same claims. Accordingly, all subjects who take part in the discourse have to give
and to ask for reasons, to assume the validity claims that commit them all to be accountable
for what they say and responsible to those who listen to them. Like Aristotle as far as the
principle of non-contradiction is concerned, Habermas argues that such claims along with the
associated game of giving and asking for reasons pertain all human beings and that all this
extends even to contexts which are not argumentative or communicative in an explicit
manner, in the sense of aiming at settling an agreement between all those who are involved
in them.
Habermas contends that talking necessarily means claiming that what we say is true (claim
to truth), sincere (claim to truthfulness) and right in relation to an enforced normative
context (claim to rightness): these are the validity claims. As a matter of fact, the scope of
this contention is still wider, because he shows that such validity claims apply even to
contexts that are not plainly argumentative or communicative.[11] Thus Habermas disproves
the classical sceptic objection that it is sufficient to draw back from a communicative
linguistic context to reject the validity claims and deny their universal or rather
transcendental-pragmatic character.
He argues indeed that these validity claims make possible the refutation of the sceptical
objections and thus they reveal the inherently interpersonal and dialogic nature of human
rationality. In order to be really consistent with herself, the sceptic is not entitled to attempt
to elude the validity claims by not talking, thus refusing to argue. Of course she can decide to
keep herself from taking part in the discussion and to opt for silence, but she cannot deny to
belong to a social and cultural form of life and to carry out communicative actions of various
kinds. On Habermas’ account, if the sceptic opts for the silence, she still remains within the
vital relationships from which she cannot draw back. Madness and suicide would be left as
her extreme options.[12] Remaining alive itself means that it isn’t conceivable that the sceptic
is able to free herself from communicative actions, because she always remains inside a daily
and ordinary argumentative praxis, which leads her to take a stand on something by
expressing a yes or a no, albeit implicitly.
Habermas argues that even being alive is a choice that forces the sceptic to take a stand,
namely to say yes or no, to select an action rather than any other one, thus meeting the
transcendental-pragmatic presuppositions and satisfying the validity claims she meant to
deny.
Therefore, there is no form of life that is not founded on communicative actions even though
Habermas admits that this may be often the case in an implicit way, that the discursive
processes, which aim at settling an agreement, may be very little institutionalised and that
the forms of argumentation may be rudimental. In this connection, Habermas talks of
transcendental-pragmatic presuppositions because even the sceptic, namely who refuses any
kind of argumentation, cannot but meet them. The sceptic cannot get off from the daily
communicative praxis that is constitutively argumentative. She is imprisoned in the
presuppositions that are necessarily implied by any argumentation and are part and parcel of
the communicative praxis that belongs to every rational subject who is embedded in a socio-
cultural form of life.
This argument shows clearly the constitutively communicative nature of the individual, even
of the radical sceptical one.[13] The individual who thinks, talks, makes her choices, and
hence lives, needs implicitly other individuals that make the collectivity to which she belongs
and is committed as much as she expects that the collectivity belongs and is committed to
her. If the principle of determinateness, which is implied by the principle of non-
contradiction and the validity claims, has a constitutive character for every one, it is possible
to argue that the individual always has a we-mode, because everyone needs the collectivity to
exercise the rationality in full and to realize one’s own nature. A collectivity is being formed
and expressed in the game of giving and asking for reasons and makes all individuals
committed to one another in a determinate communicative context that may be more or less
explicit and institutionalised. Therefore the collectivity needs not to be intended as a plural
subject, to which single individuals must somehow submit, which accordingly is something
more than the interpersonal relation in which the individuals are committed to one another.
5. Gilbert’s Joint Commitment and Collective Beliefs 
In this connection I think that talking of collectivity as a plural subject, which is a body or a
unit, is as much overshooting an argument as ascribing collective beliefs to collectivity is
problematic. Are we allowed to say that the collectivity is a plural subject that has collective
beliefs like in Gilbert’s theory? This hypothesis may face many difficulties. The first difficulty
derives from ascribing the belief, which pertains a single individual or a single subject, to
something that instead is plural: the collectivity. The collectivity as a whole made of many
individuals who act in an interpersonal manner by means of the joint commitments cannot
be considered a unitary subject that has beliefs. The beliefs are proper to particular
individuals that express them through language in a given social context and are mutually
committed as regards these beliefs to other individuals who share the same context. This is
how individuals build a shared social reality that in its turn makes them a collectivity. Two
or more individuals come across sharing the same belief through discussions, dialogues, but
in the sense that each will have a belief with the same content in the same context and not in
the sense that there is a collective belief over and beyond the beliefs of the single individuals.
Gilbert claims that just because the collective belief belongs to the collectivity as a plural
subject, this kind of belief is independent of the particular beliefs of the individuals that are
parties of it. Moreover, she claims that the individual X within a given group G may have a
different belief from that of the group to which she belongs and to which she has an
obligation because she is jointly committed to G as one of its members. But how could such a
thing be possible? One should admit of the paradoxical situation in which an individual X has
the determinate belief A, for example that today it is raining, while as one of the members of
G she is jointly committed to believe non-A, that is to say that today it is not raining. The
only explanation for such a situation is that in either case the subject is stating something he
does not believe to be the case, hence that she is not satisfying the claim to truthfulness.
The careful analysis of some cases that Gilbert brings to support the notion of collective
belief shows that what is called a belief is not really a belief. Let’s consider the case of the
Event Committee for the Celebration of the 50th University Anniversary.[14] After a debate
among its members, the Committee as a group decides to state that Prof. Rowling will be a
good speaker and to support him for that role. Are we allowed to say that the Committee
statement that Prof. Rowling is a good speaker is a belief and that this is a collective belief
being held by a group? Rather wouldn’t it be better to say that this statement is the outcome
of a strategy or that it articulates the agreement emerged through the discussion held by the
members of the Committee, hence of the group, whose individual parties have decided
through the negotiation to support the opinion that Prof. Rowling is a good speaker? In this
case, we can concede that the group strategy may not coincide with the particular beliefs of
one or more individuals that are members of the Committee without facing a paradox. For
instance, it may be that I do not believe that Rowling will be a good speaker and that
nonetheless I decide to support the strategy to present him as a good speaker for other
reasons. However this makes sense if we use the concept of strategy, of the convergence
within a group that results from the negotiation between the members rather than
introducing collective beliefs. The negotiation is still binding and implies rights and
obligations even without producing a collective belief, because the members are jointly
committed to supporting Rowling as a good speaker. As soon as an individual X agrees as a
Committee member with other subjects Y, W, Z… who are also parties of the Committee in
claiming that Rowling is a good speaker, X is jointly committed. If X decided afterward to
state publicly that Rowling is not a good speaker, the other parties of the group would have
the right and the obligation to rebuke her and recall her to the joint commitment she had
endorsed within the group independently of her individual beliefs. Therefore, there is no
need to talk either of the group in terms of a body or of collective beliefs to allow for joint
commitments, which entail rights and obligations for the parties of the group and for the
formation of the collectivity that acts socially. The beliefs always pertain to the individuals
and only the individual subjects have and express them through language. In this way, every
subject commits herself to the game of giving and asking for reasons on what she thinks and
says owing to the principle of non-contradiction and the validity claims, which are
constitutive of our speech acts and of the correlated intentional states, as Searle would say
(Searle 1969, 1983).[15]
Accordingly either we don’t call the beliefs at stake in cases like the example of the Event
Committee collective beliefs or, if we ascribe beliefs to the group, we consider the group as a
subject that should have consciousness and mental states, thus paving the way to admitting
of the mind of the group even if Gilbert denies that this is her view.
6. Conclusions 
In conclusion, I tried to show that if we want to assure that the collectivity and the
interpersonal action have a binding force and to avoid their interpretation as a sum or an
aggregate, we don’t need to bring in such concepts as plural subject or collective beliefs,
because we risk to create an ambiguous level in which the collectivity becomes a unitary
subject endowed with powers, which makes it a reality beyond the interpersonal relations
among its members and to which we have to ascribe features that are instead peculiar to the
individuals. The dimension of the commitment, hence of the rights and the obligations, is
instead assured by the interpersonal relations among the individuals, but those relations
must be considered as such and must not be separated from the acknowledgment of the
individual space. Only in this space the dimension of the plurality and the commitments
unfolds, which is constitutive of the exercise of human rationality.
The fact that mere individuals are to be jointly committed, instead of one plural subject that
is a unitary body over and above them, does not make the commitment and the rights and
the obligations it implies less compelling. On the contrary, as we have argued on the grounds
of Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction and of Habermas’ transcendental-pragmatic
presuppositions, the individual is always placed into a social-cultural context in which she is
always engaged in relations with other individuals at the argumentative and the
communicative level, albeit this level may be more or less explicit or institutionalised. Every
subject is always already committed to another one, a you, or to many other ones who in
their turn make commitments in the same way by taking a stand with a yes or a no. The
collectivity is such a mode for individuals of opening up relations and of mutually
committing to one another through the implicit or explicit exercise of their dialectic
rationality.
Copyright © 2017 Claudia Rosciglione
Claudia Rosciglione. «Individuals and collectivity between the priciple of non-contradiction and
the joint commitment». Dialegesthai. Rivista telematica di filosofia [in linea], anno 19 (2017)
[inserito il 30 dicembre 2017], disponibile su World Wide Web:
<http://mondodomani.org/dialegesthai/>, [33 KB], ISSN 1128-5478.
Notes
1.  R. Tuomela, Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents, Oxford University
Press, USA 2013. 
2.  M. Gilbert, «A Real Unity of Them All», The Monist, vol. 92, no 2 (2009), pp. 268-285; Il noi
collettivo, Raffaello Cortina, Milano 2015, 11ff. 
3.  M. Gilbert, On Social Facts, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1989. 
4.  M. Gilbert, On Social Facts, quoted in note 3; M. Gilbert, A Real Unity, quoted in note 2, 274
ff.. 
5.  M. Gilbert, A Real Unity, 275. 
6.  Ibid. Gilbert often associates the concept of social group with that of plural subject, intended
as 'a set of jointly committed persons'. It seems that talking of a set of persons she leaves room
for the individual personal dimension, which is not completely abolished. Yet the concept of
the plural subject is explicitly brought in to make reference to the collectivity, the group as a
whole, as a body in which the individualities must take a back seat, if not be abolished. 
7.  Gilbert puts explicitly forth her theory of the plural subject as a collectivist model in
opposition to the individualist model such as, for instance, Michael Bratman’s (M. Gilbert, A
Real Unity ). According to Gilbert, there could be a shared, hence a collective, we only if the
parties are jointly committed as a body or a unit to act and believe in a particular way. This
condition allows talking of collective actions and collective beliefs. On the contrary, Bratman
distinguishes between shared intentions and personal intentions, but the former are a web of
attitudes of the individual participants. As a consequence, a shared intention is not an attitude
in any mind, in a fused superagent (like Gilbert’s plural subject), rather it is a state of affairs
that consists in the attitudes of participants and the interrelations between those attitudes. On
Bratman’s account, in the shared intention the constitutive intentions of individual are
interlocking (M. Bratman, «Shared Cooperative Activity», Philosophical Review, 1992, 101,
327-340; «Shared Intention», Ethics, 1993, 101, 97-113). 
8.  See Aristotle, Metaphysik, G, 1006 a 12-28 . 
9.  See Aristotle, Metaphysik, G, 1009 a 4-30. 
10.  See Aristotle, Metaphysik, G, 1008 b 3-30. 
11.  J. Habermas Moralbewustsein and kommunikatives Handeln, Surkamp, Frankfurt am Main,
1983. 
12.  Ibidem. 
13.  In Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Habermas points out that every form of linguistic
communication implies an intersubjective recognition, because the speech act of the Ego is
successful only if the Alter accepts the offer contained in that act by taking a stand with a yes
or a no on those validity claims (truth, truthfulness, normative rightness), which are implied
by the very speech act. On Habermas’ account, then, understanding a particular speech act
implies already that every hearer exercises one’s rationality. The hearer knows the grammar
and the forms of order, but also the essential conditions, namely the validity claims, which
may provide her with a motive to take an affirmative stand on that speech act. In this
connection, understanding means exercising already one’s own rationality by taking a stand
with a yes or a no. This game of taking a stand as well as of giving and asking for reasons is
the intersubjective foundation of rationality and entails settling an agreement between the Ego
and the Alter (J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Surkamp, Frankfurt am
Main, 1981, Bd. 1). 
14.  M. Gilbert , m. Priest M. Conversation and Collective Belief, in Perspectives on Pragmatics
and Philosophy (Ed. by Capone A., Carapezza M., Lo Piparo F.,) Springer, 2013, pp. 1-34. 
15.  J. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1969; Intentionality,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983. 
Copyright © Dialegesthai 2017 (ISSN 1128-5478) | filosofia@mondodomani.org | Direzione e redazione
Editoriale | Indice cronologico | Indice degli autori | Contatti | Collegamenti | Collana
